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  1. Guttz
    Cables Portray Expanded Reach of Drug Agency

    WASHINGTON — The Drug Enforcement Administration has been transformed into a global intelligence organization with a reach that extends far beyond narcotics, and an eavesdropping operation so expansive it has to fend off foreign politicians who want to use it against their political enemies, according to secret diplomatic cables.

    In far greater detail than previously seen, the cables, from the cache obtained by WikiLeaks and made available to some news organizations, offer glimpses of drug agents balancing diplomacy and law enforcement in places where it can be hard to tell the politicians from the traffickers, and where drug rings are themselves mini-states whose wealth and violence permit them to run roughshod over struggling governments.

    Diplomats recorded unforgettable vignettes from the largely unseen war on drugs:

    ¶In Panama, an urgent BlackBerry message from the president to the American ambassador demanded that the D.E.A. go after his political enemies: “I need help with tapping phones.”

    ¶In Sierra Leone, a major cocaine-trafficking prosecution was almost upended by the attorney general’s attempt to solicit $2.5 million in bribes.

    ¶In Guinea, the country’s biggest narcotics kingpin turned out to be the president’s son, and diplomats discovered that before the police destroyed a huge narcotics seizure, the drugs had been replaced by flour.

    ¶Leaders of Mexico’s beleaguered military issued private pleas for closer collaboration with the drug agency, confessing that they had little faith in their own country’s police forces.

    ¶Cables from Myanmar, the target of strict United States sanctions, describe the drug agency informants’ reporting both on how the military junta enriches itself with drug money and on the political activities of the junta’s opponents.

    Officials of the D.E.A. and the State Department declined to discuss what they said was information that should never have been made public.

    Like many of the cables made public in recent weeks, those describing the drug war do not offer large disclosures. Rather, it is the details that add up to a clearer picture of the corrupting influence of big traffickers, the tricky game of figuring out which foreign officials are actually controlled by drug lords, and the story of how an entrepreneurial agency operating in the shadows of the F.B.I. has become something more than a drug agency. The D.E.A. now has 87 offices in 63 countries and close partnerships with governments that keep the Central Intelligence Agency at arm’s length.

    Because of the ubiquity of the drug scourge, today’s D.E.A. has access to foreign governments, including those, like Nicaragua’s and Venezuela’s, that have strained diplomatic relations with the United States. Many are eager to take advantage of the agency’s drug detection and wiretapping technologies.

    In some countries, the collaboration appears to work well, with the drug agency providing intelligence that has helped bring down traffickers, and even entire cartels. But the victories can come at a high price, according to the cables, which describe scores of D.E.A. informants and a handful of agents who have been killed in Mexico and Afghanistan.

    In Venezuela, the local intelligence service turned the tables on the D.E.A., infiltrating its operations, sabotaging equipment and hiring a computer hacker to intercept American Embassy e-mails, the cables report.

    And as the drug agency has expanded its eavesdropping operations to keep up with cartels, it has faced repeated pressure to redirect its counternarcotics surveillance to local concerns, provoking tensions with some of Washington’s closest allies.

    Sticky Situations

    Cables written in February by American diplomats in Paraguay, for example, described the D.E.A.’s pushing back against requests from that country’s government to help spy on an insurgent group, known as the Paraguayan People’s Army, or the EPP, the initials of its name in Spanish. The leftist group, suspected of having ties to the Colombian rebel group FARC, had conducted several high-profile kidnappings and was making a small fortune in ransoms.

    When American diplomats refused to give Paraguay access to the drug agency’s wiretapping system, Interior Minister Rafael Filizzola threatened to shut it down, saying: “Counternarcotics are important, but won’t topple our government. The EPP could.”

    The D.E.A. faced even more intense pressure last year from Panama, whose right-leaning president, Ricardo Martinelli, demanded that the agency allow him to use its wiretapping program — known as Matador — to spy on leftist political enemies he believed were plotting to kill him.

    The United States, according to the cables, worried that Mr. Martinelli, a supermarket magnate, “made no distinction between legitimate security targets and political enemies,” refused, igniting tensions that went on for months.

    Mr. Martinelli, who the cables said possessed a “penchant for bullying and blackmail,” retaliated by proposing a law that would have ended the D.E.A.’s work with specially vetted police units. Then he tried to subvert the drug agency’s control over the program by assigning nonvetted officers to the counternarcotics unit.

    And when the United States pushed back against those attempts — moving the Matador system into the offices of the politically independent attorney general — Mr. Martinelli threatened to expel the drug agency from the country altogether, saying other countries, like Israel, would be happy to comply with his intelligence requests.

    Eventually, according to the cables, American diplomats began wondering about Mr. Martinelli’s motivations. Did he really want the D.E.A. to disrupt plots by his adversaries, or was he trying to keep the agency from learning about corruption among his relatives and friends?

    One cable asserted that Mr. Martinelli’s cousin helped smuggle tens of millions of dollars in drug proceeds through Panama’s main airport every month. Another noted, “There is no reason to believe there will be fewer acts of corruption in this government than in any past government.”

    As the standoff continued, the cables indicate that the United States proposed suspending the Matador program, rather than submitting to Mr. Martinelli’s demands. (American officials say the program was suspended, but the British took over the wiretapping program and have shared the intelligence with the United States.)

    In a statement on Saturday, the government of Panama said that it regretted “the bad interpretation by United States authorities of a request for help made to directly confront crime and drug trafficking.” It said that Panama would continue its efforts to stop organized crime and emphasized that Panama continued to have “excellent relations with the United States.”

    Meanwhile in Paraguay, according to the cables, the United States acquiesced, agreeing to allow the authorities there to use D.E.A. wiretaps for antikidnapping investigations, as long as they were approved by Paraguay’s Supreme Court.

    “We have carefully navigated this very sensitive and politically sticky situation,” one cable said. “It appears that we have no other viable choice.”

    A Larger Mandate

    Created in 1973, the D.E.A. has steadily built its international turf, an expansion primarily driven by the multinational nature of the drug trade, but also by forces within the agency seeking a larger mandate. Since the 2001 terrorist attacks, the agency’s leaders have cited what they describe as an expanding nexus between drugs and terrorism in further building its overseas presence.

    In Afghanistan, for example, “DEA officials have become convinced that ‘no daylight’ exists between drug traffickers at the highest level and Taliban insurgents,” Karen Tandy, then the agency’s administrator, told European Union officials in a 2007 briefing, according to a cable from Brussels.

    Ms. Tandy described an agency informant’s recording of a meeting in Nangarhar Province between 9 Taliban members and 11 drug traffickers to coordinate their financial support for the insurgency, and she said the agency was trying to put a “security belt” around Afghanistan to block the import of chemicals for heroin processing. The agency was embedding its officers in military units around Afghanistan, she said. In 2007 alone, the D.E.A. opened new bureaus in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Dubai, United Arab Emirates, as well as in three Mexican cities.

    Cables describe lengthy negotiations over the extradition to the United States of the two notorious arms dealers wanted by the D.E.A. as it reached beyond pure counternarcotics cases: Monzer al-Kassar, a Syrian arrested in Spain, and Viktor Bout, a Russian arrested in Thailand. Both men were charged with agreeing to illegal arms sales to informants posing as weapons buyers for Colombian rebels. Notably, neither man was charged with violating narcotics laws.

    Late last year in a D.E.A. case, three men from Mali accused of plotting to transport tons of cocaine across northwest Africa were charged under a narco-terrorism statute added to the law in 2006, and they were linked to both Al Qaeda and its North African affiliate, called Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.

    The men themselves had claimed the terrorism link, according to the D.E.A., though officials told The New York Times that they had no independent corroboration of the Qaeda connections. Experts on the desert regions of North Africa, long a route for smuggling between Africa and Europe, are divided about whether Al Qaeda operatives play a significant role in the drug trade, and some skeptics note that adding “terrorism” to any case can draw additional investigative resources and impress a jury.

    New Routes for Graft

    Most times, however, the agency’s expansion seems driven more by external forces than internal ones, with traffickers opening new routes to accommodate new markets. As Mexican cartels take control of drug shipments from South America to the United States, Colombian cartels have begun moving cocaine through West Africa to Europe.

    The cables offer a portrait of the staggering effect on Mali, whose deserts have been littered with abandoned airplanes — including at least one Boeing 727 — and Ghana, where traffickers easily smuggle drugs through an airport’s “VVIP (Very Very Important Person) lounge.”

    Top-to-bottom corruption in many West African countries made it hard for diplomats to know whom to trust. In one 2008 case in Sierra Leone, President Ernest Bai Koroma moved to prosecute and extradite three South American traffickers seized with about 1,500 pounds of cocaine, while his attorney general was accused of offering to release them for $2.5 million in bribes.

    In Nigeria, the D.E.A. reported a couple of years earlier that diplomats at the Liberian Embassy were using official vehicles to transport drugs across the border because they were not getting paid by their war-torn government and “had to fend for themselves.”

    A May 2008 cable from Guinea described a kind of heart-to-heart conversation about the drug trade between the American ambassador, Phillip Carter III, and Guinea’s prime minister, Lansana Kouyaté. At one point, the cable said, Mr. Kouyaté “visibly slumped in his chair” and acknowledged that Guinea’s most powerful drug trafficker was Ousmane Conté, the son of Lansana Conté, then the president. (After the death of his father, Mr. Conté went to prison.)

    A few days later, diplomats reported evidence that the corruption ran much deeper inside the Guinean government than the president’s son. In a colorfully written cable — with chapters titled “Excuses, Excuses, Excuses” and “Theatrical Production” — diplomats described attending what was billed as a drug bonfire that had been staged by the Guinean government to demonstrate its commitment to combating the drug trade.

    Senior Guinean officials, including the country’s drug czar, the chief of police and the justice minister, watched as officers set fire to what the government claimed was about 350 pounds of marijuana and 860 pounds of cocaine, valued at $6.5 million.

    In reality, American diplomats wrote, the whole incineration was a sham. Informants had previously told the embassy that Guinean authorities replaced the cocaine with manioc flour, proving, the diplomats wrote, “that narco-corruption has contaminated” the government of Guinea “at the highest levels.”

    And it did not take the D.E.A.’s sophisticated intelligence techniques to figure out the truth. The cable reported that even the ambassador’s driver sniffed out a hoax.

    “I know the smell of burning marijuana,” the driver said. “And I didn’t smell anything.”

    Published: December 25, 2010


  1. talltom
    WikiLeaks Cables: Drug Enforcement Agency Goes Global, Beyond Drugs

    The US Drug Enforcement Administration has grown into a global intelligence organization whose reach extends far beyond international drug trafficking, The New York Times reported.

    Citing documents from the secrets website WikiLeaks, the newspaper said the DEA's operations had become so expansive the agency has had to fend off foreign politicians who want to use it against their political enemies.

    One August 2009 cable reported Panamanian President Ricardo Martinelli as having sent an urgent BlackBerry message to the US ambassador asking the DEA go after his political enemies.

    "I need help with tapping phones," the paper quoted the president as saying.

    A May 2008 cable from the West African nation of Guinea, reported that the country's biggest narcotics kingpin was Ousman Conte, the son of the then president, Lansana Conte.

    A March 2008 cable from Guinea said diplomats had discovered that before police there had destroyed a huge narcotics seizure, the drugs had been replaced by flour.

    Army officer Lansana Conte was arrested in February 2009, two months after a junta led by Captain Moussa Dadis Camara seized power on the death of his father after 24 years at the head of the west African nation.

    He was released on bail in July this year after spending more than 16 months in prison for alleged drug trafficking.

    An October 2009 cable from the US embassy in Mexico, said leaders of the military there had issued private pleas for closer collaboration with the US drug agency, because they did not trust their own police force.

    The cable said Mexico's Defense Secretary, Guillermo Galvan "will try to keep military actions in its own channels rather than working more broadly with Mexico's law enforcement community."

    In Sierra Leone, the attorney general solicited 2.5 million dollars in bribes from defendants in a major cocaine-trafficking prosecution, according to a March 2009 cable, quoted by The Times.

    But the country's president Ernest Koroma, had intervened to scuttle the deal.

    Cables from Myanmar describe DEA informants reporting both on how the military junta enriches itself with drug money and on the political activities of the junta's opponents, the paper noted.

    US government officials declined to discuss what they said was information that should never have been made public, the report said.


    December 27, 2010


    © 2010 AFP All rights reserved.
  2. gmeziscool2354
    the power the DEA weilds is absurd and this really is just the tip of the iceberg. lots of conspiracy theorists say the CIA is the agency that goes to far, but the DEA blows the lid off that argument
  3. godztear
    Just out of curiosity, where do these so-called "cables" even come from? I understand the Wikileaks thing, but who is to say that the source is anything reputable? All I keep reading is cables, cables, cables when before this whole controversy no one made any mention of them.
  4. Alfa
    Threads merged.
  5. 80sbaby
    cables bro, like imagine, back in the day in the subs, when they had to talk about firing missles, and so on, they used morse code, same concept like how a cable works now, but much more high tech and these are obviously just intelligence cables not nuclear crisis cables.
  6. 80sbaby
    and lord knows who posts them, diplomats ambassadors, who the fuck prolly the DEA just talking back and forth to each other lol
  7. Terrapinzflyer
    a cable is nothing more then a word for a message- whether an email or letter. it has been ingrained in political speak since the day of the telegraph- when the ability to send a message in minutes or hours was a revolution over it taking days or weeks.
  8. 80sbaby
    wikipedia shows nothing on this matador program.

    o and btw, if the dea has this big of scope, how would u apply that to the internet, or is the dea more hands on.
  9. Terrapinzflyer
    ^^ there is quite a lot of info out there on Matador

    "Operation Matador" - A Well Kept Secret
    The mechanism used by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA, for its acronym in English) to support the National Security Council of Panama to intercept telephone communications linked to drug trafficking, remains a mystery. It is only known that this is the operation known as "Matador" to fight drug trafficking. The issue comes to light with the publication - in international news medial outlets - the cables released by Wikileaks in which it is revealed that President Ricardo Martinelli requested assistance from the United States (U.S.) to spy on his political opponents, which was denied by the Government saying it was a "misunderstanding."

    "Operation Matador" was implemented in Panama in 2007 during the administration of former President Martin Torrijos, after the U.S. donated equipment capable of intercepting cellular telephone communications to the National Security Council, whose facilities are located in Quarry Heights, at the foot of Ancon Hill. At that time the National Security Council already had other equipment of British origin to intercept cellular telephones.

    Mechanism - The equipment donated by the U.S., according to judicial sources, is able to intercept 100 landlines or cellular telephones simultaneously. The telephone numbers can be changed only every 30 days. The work of listening, according to the sources, is performed by at least 40 officers of the National Police, who in addition to their base salary receive an additional bonus from the US government. They are called the "little ears."

    The sources emphasized that the wiretaps, made through "Operation Matador", are exclusively for legal proceedings that are lead by prosecutors of the Public Ministry in coordination with the Drug Enforcement Administration. To ensure that action is lawful, the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court must authorize every cellular telephone number to be intercepted before hand. "There is no written agreement saying the equipment is to be operated by Americans," said one of the sources.

    Kidnapping - The judicial sources recalled that the 11 August 2009, the police received a report of the kidnapping of a minor in the area of Arraiján. The complaint was filed by the boy's mother, after the kidnappers demanded the payment of a $70,000 dollar ransom for the child's release. The child was eventually rescued and the kidnappers were captured as they made a "controlled delivery." A day after the abduction, Martinelli and Vice President Juan Carlos Varela met with the former US Ambassador to Panama, Barbara Stephenson to discuss the issue. Indeed, one of the cables released by Wikileaks referred to another meeting between the Minister of the Presidency, Demetrio Papadimitriu, Jaime Trujillo, former director of the Security Council, and former security secretary, Jose Abel Almengor, who advocated for a change to procedures for the system in the case of kidnappings, when "the ability to quickly wiretap was necessary."

    According to the cables, they warned that "the current system does not allow the Government sufficient flexibility to select the targets." In this approach, the U.S. Embassy responded that "the technical capacity existed, and that the Government should consider a rapid response procedure for obtaining court orders." (Panama America)

    Editor's Comment: The United States, the DEA, and the US Embassy retained considerable control over the operational implementation and use of the "Operation Matador" equipment - probably to ensure it was not used for illegal or otherwise unauthorized intercept operations. They would apparently take a list of targets to the Supreme Court every 30 days for authorization. The issues being discussed in the Wikileaks cables were procedural in nature - if the Supreme Court could quickly approve a change to the target roster then the cell phone could be intercepted in the case of a kidnapping, for example. I'm sure the entire issue of requesting a change to the targeting schematic came about as a result of this kidnapping in Arriajan - when they could not use the "Matador" equipment against the kidnappers because there was no court order in place. The US response was to suggest to the Panamanian government that they should change their procedures in order to be able to obtain a court order and authorization in a more nimble manner. Seems reasonable, no?

    Monday, December 27 2010
    Contributed by: Don Winner

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